Arab-Israeli conflict; Jimmy Carter; Camp David; James Callaghan; Menachem Begin. In off-the-record answers during a briefing for American correspondents in London before his departure to Washington, Callaghan argued that he had a lot in common with the new President: 'they shared the same initials, they had both been in the Navy, they were both Baptists and both had David Brown tractors.' 10 How 6 far this eclectic collection of coincidences might provide the basis for a strong personal relationship remained to be seen, however.
In some respects, the successful passage of resolution 242 was a final hurrah both for the British 'moment in the Middle East' more generally, 3 and specifically for its role as a key diplomatic broker in the Arab-Israeli peace process. While the Four-Power talks, involving relatively harmonious. While the scope of bilateral relations was obviously considerably broader than merely the personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the President, Carter and Callaghan did strike up a strong rapport early in the life of the new Administration which would subsequently prove to be of some importance in the high level diplomacy of the peace process.
The first Callaghan-Carter phone conversation took place on 13 January 1977, shortly before Carter's inauguration. 8 Callaghan displayed all the familiar characteristics of any British Prime Minister in his first exchange with a new incumbent in the White House, eagerly seeking an early invitation to Washington but not wanting to appear too desperate.
The British Presidency of the EEC during the first six months of 1977 gave Callaghan an extra card to play, allowing him to suggest that a visit to Washington before a planned meeting of European Heads of Government on 25 March, would allow him to report back to other EEC leaders on any issues of broader transatlantic concern. In the event Carter readily agreed to a visit in early March which proved to be a signal success for the Prime Minister. A character sketch of the new President prepared by the British Ambassador to the United States, Peter Ramsbotham, in advance of Callaghan's visit noted that while Carter had moved naturally and rapidly into the responsibilities of office, his experience in international affairs was limited. Somewhat more ominously Ramsbotham observed that 'Carter operates on a short fuse, and I find this, together with his streak of obstinacy mildly disturbing and I wonder how he will react to the inevitable frustrations of the Presidency.' Nevertheless, Ramsbotham expressed the belief that Carter would 'recognise and respect the Prime Minister's great personal experience in international affairs.' 9 In off-the-record answers during a briefing for
American correspondents in London before his departure to Washington, Callaghan argued that he had a lot in common with the new President: 'they shared the same initials, they had both been in the Navy, they were both Baptists and both had David Brown tractors.' 10 How far this eclectic collection of coincidences might provide the basis for a strong personal relationship remained to be seen, however.
In the event, both the business meetings between Carter and Callaghan on 10 and 11
March, and the accompanying social programme for the visit passed off smoothly and successfully. Carter broke the ice during his formal welcome for the Prime Minister on the White House South Lawn by paying generous homage to the "special relationship" between the two countries. 11 Callaghan too displayed none of his predecessors Edward Heath or Harold Wilson's squeamishness about this terminology: 'I see no reason why we should refrain from using this term', he noted in his speech during the state dinner. 'It is not an exclusive relationship. It shuts no one out, and it does describe with accuracy the ease, the intimacy, the common feeling which Americans and Britons share with each other when we meet and talk….'
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The Arab-Israeli conflict was one of a series of international issues addressed during Waldheim.' 28 The reply from the Foreign Office confirmed Callaghan's suspicions: 'we now know that there was another reason for his visit. We are arranging for a report [section deleted and retained under section 3(4)] to be sent to you.' 29 Callaghan's Private Secretary subsequently replied that 'the Prime Minister was interested to see the report you mention', although no copy was evidently retained in his files, presumably because it was immediately returned to its point of origin. 30 While the redactions mean that no certain conclusion can be drawn, it is highly likely this was a Security Service (MI5) report on the meeting between Hussein and Dayan.
Since 1963, Hussein had begun meeting Israeli representatives at the home of his London physician, Dr Emmanuel Herbert. Dr Herbert's home was certainly not the only venue for these covert meetings, many of which took place in the region, but it was the most significant overseas venue. According to one source Dr Herbert had originally been recommended to Hussein and his family in the 1950s by MI5 as a man of discretion who treated many foreign dignitaries. The fact that he was also an ardent Zionist meant that it was relatively easy for officials at the Israeli Embassy to cultivate contact with him as well. 31 personally. 39 The distaste with which Begin continued to be viewed in official circles was mirrored in the character sketch of him prepared by the Foreign Office, which described him with no small irony as 'a local terrorist made good'. 40 Begin's recognition of the fact that the Prime Minister had taken something of a political risk in inviting him to London was no doubt part of the reason why from the outset, on this occasion, he seemed much more well disposed from seeing these despatches which were copied to his office. Begin was to be persuaded to accept that resolution 242 applied to all fronts including the West Bank in return for the sacrifice by Egypt of territory in the Sinai. It is hardly surprising that the Egyptian delegation rejected the proposal, with the Speaker of the National Assembly Sayid Marei commenting that 'if Mr Begin's political commitments were at issue that was his problem, but the Sinai settlements were a different issue from those on the West Bank.'
The damage done to Anglo-Egyptian relations and Britain's credibility as an honest broker in the peace process was not apparent to Callaghan. Minister. 'I think we are likely to hear a good deal more of the Jordanian argument that it is little good our welcoming the Egypt/Israel agreement as a first step in a comprehensive settlement if at the same time we condone Israeli moves in the occupied territories which make an ultimate settlement impossible', wrote Urwick. 90 In yet another meeting with Begin during his stopover at Heathrow the day after the Security Council vote, Callaghan told the Israeli leader in private that the UK did not support Israeli settlement policy. 91 But the Prime Minister's actions spoke louder than his words.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, therefore, that the Callaghan government was an outlier among British governments in its approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process. This was due in large measure to the personal predilections of the Prime Minister who both cultivated a close relationship with the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and departed from established principles of British foreign policy in effectively condoning Begin's position over settlements in the occupied territories. The justification offered by Callaghan for his repeated refusal to take a stand on the issue of Israeli settlement policy was that he was accruing political capital with the Israeli leader which might be used at a later date. But if this was so, the capital was never drawn down during the period of his administration. While it has been argued that with Wilson's resignation, the Foreign Office was able to promote a more proArab policy under Callaghan, the evidence presented here suggests otherwise. 92 Israel together, and despite the slaughter, he was later unable to achieve his purpose in Lebanon. Moreover, he was never able, as Sadat was, to take the broad view. Sadat was the bigger man of the two….' 93 But this stood in stark contrast to the approach Callaghan had actually adopted while in office.
In "You are responsible! Because you didn't bomb the railway line!"' 95 Thatcher subsequently described the meeting as 'one of the most difficult she had experienced', explaining that she had been unable to make any headway at all when she had raised the issue of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. 96 But then, this was hardly surprising since Begin had become accustomed to a rather different approach from her predecessor in office. 97 
